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STUDENT NOTES
rafts, logs, etc., and has in fact been used for that purpose, the public
has an easement of navigation in it." A creek susceptible, at certain
periods of the year, of valuable use for the purpose of floating logs to
market must be considered, to that extent, a navigable or floatable
stream.'" It is not essential that the navigable capacity of the stream
should be continuous; it is sufficient if its periods of high water and
navigable capacity continue a sufficient length of time to make it use-
ful as a highway."7 But a stream that is not capable, during freshets,
unaided by artificial means, of floating saw logs, is not a public high-
way for that purpose." And a stream may be navigable for the pur-
pose of floating logs and timber to market, though it is not navigable
for boats at ordinary stages of the river. 9 The Kentucky courts will
take judicial notice of the navigable character of the Ohio River,- and
of the Kentucky River,- but it cannot be assumed that such a stream
as Straight Creek, in Bell County, is navigable, although courts might
take judicial notice of the fact in regard to streams of more public
importance."
It appears, therefore, that the legal test of navigability of waters
in Kentucky depends entirely upon the question involved. If it is a
question of the title of riparian owners to the bed of the stream, the
common law or tidal test of navigability is applied; if the question is
one of the right of the public to navigate the stream, or the right of a
governmental agency to improve it, as in the principal case, the test
is whether the stream is navigable in fact. There appears to be no
particular reason for the distinction, but on the other hand there seems
to be no particular inconvenience resulting from it.
JosEPH S. FREELAND.
TORTS: LIMITATION OF DOCTRINE OF ATTRACTIVE NUI-
SANCE IN KENTUCKY TO PERSONS UNDER
14 YEARS OF AGE
In the case of Dennis' Administrator v. Kentucky and West Vir-
ginia Power Company' a boy, 16 years of age, who had climbed defend-
ant's electric transmission tower in order to see a ball game on a
"Goodin's Exrs. v. Ky. Lumber Co., 90 Ky. 625, 12 Ky. Law Rep.
573, 14 S. W. 775 (1890); Floyd County v. Allen, 190 Ky. 532, 227 S. W.
994 (1921).
"I Ford Lumber and Mfg. Co. v. McQueen, 14 Ky. Law Rep. 521
(Super. Ct. 1892).
"l Murray v. Preston, 106 Ky. 561, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 72, 50 S. W.
1095 (1399).
" Banks v. Frazier, 111 Ky. 909, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1197, 64 S. W.
983 (1901).
"Ireland v. Bowman, 130 Ky. 153, 113 S. W. 56, 17 Ann. Cas. 786
(1908).
"'Bennett v. Bryan, 1 Ky. Law Rep. 274 (1880).
"Warner v. Ford Lumber and Mfg Co., 123 Ky. 103, 93 S. W. 650
(1906).
2 Hoskins v. Archer, 6 Ky. Law Rep. 671 (1885).
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nearby field was electrocuted. In that case there was no allegation
that deceased was of subnormal mentality, and the court refused to
apply the attractive nuisance doctrine saying that a normal 16-year-old
boy was out of the class for whose benefit the doctrine was created.
The so-called "attractive nuisance" doctrine which is apparently
an exception to the well-established rule that one owes no duty to a
trespasser other than not to injure him by wanton and willful miscon-
duct,2 is founded upon the theory that one maintaining on his prem-
ises some contrivance both attractive and dangerous to children who
are in the habit of playing upon or around such premises, owes a duty to
exercise ordinary care for the protection of such indiscreet trespassers
as are attracted by said object. It is clear that when a person arrives
at such an age as would take him out of the class of indiscreet chil-
dren he is no longer entitled to the benefit of the doctrine; unless it
affirmatively appears that due to defective mental development, his
mental age is such as to bring him within the protected class.
In L. & N. R. Co. v. Hutton,3 the court held the doctrine not ap-
plicable to a boy 14 years, 7 months old, in the absence of any show-
ing of subnormal mental development saying: "If an infant has
arrived at the age (14 years) to render him presumptively responsible
for his contributory negligence, he would likewise be responsible when
that negligence was committed by him while trespassing upon the
property of another, since if responsibility attaches to him on account
of his contributory negligence when he is at a place where he has a
right to be, it should also at least prima facie operate against him
when he is at a place where he does not have the right to be."
In Columbus Mining Co. v. Napier's Administrator 4 a child 15
years old, a trespasser upon defendant's land, was overcome by gas
and died in a driftmouth in which he was playing. There was some
evidence that deceased did not possess ordinary intelligence. The
court held that the presumption that a child of such age is outside the
protected class is conclusive, and subscribed to the doctrine of the
Alabama court in Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Robins.6
In Commonwealth v. Henderson's Guardian,O the court held that
the rule requiring use of ordinary care in keeping explosives did not
apply to trespassers except as to infants of tender years; and that
the presumption favoring trespassing infants was inapplicable to a
child 15 years of age, unless he was shown to be of subnormal
mentality.
Thus the Kentucky Court seems to reason by analogy from the
law as applicable to contributory negligence. Indeed the rule seems to
1258 Ky. 106, 79 S. W. (2d-) 377 (1935). But see 83 Ky. 119 (1885).
2122 Ky. 369, 92 S. W. 330 (1906); 78 Ind. 323, 41 Am. Rep. 572
(1881); 35 Ga. App. 639, 134 S. E. 189 (1926).
3220 Ky. 277, 295 S. W. 175 (1924).
4 239 Ky. 642, 40 S. W. (2d) 285 (1931).
r209 Ala. 6, 95 So. 367, 36 A. L. R. 10 (1923).
6245 Ky. 328, 53 S. W. (2d) 694 (1932).
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be well established both generally7 and in Kentucky8 that between
7 and 14 years there is a presumption, which may be rebutted, that the
child does not possess sufficient understanding and discretion to be
guilty of contributory negligence and that when the child is over 14
the presumption is that he has capacity and understanding sufficient
to constitute contributory negligence.
But it may be questioned whether the analogy is well taken. Ap-
parently the only conclusion which could be drawn from the law as
applicable to contributory negligence would be as to whether contribu-
tory negligence existed in the particular case, since one could possess
sufficient discretion to be guilty of contributory negligence and still
not necessarily have sufficient discretion to be without the attractive
nuisance doctrine.
But the authorities upon the doctrine of attractive nuisance seem
to be almost unanimously in accord with the opinions herein expressed
that presumptively it does not apply to persons over 14 years of age.'
One case has been found supporting a contrary view,0 but that case
was somewhat peculiar on its facts.
In addition the legislature by certain statutes gives evidence that
an Infant of 14 has presumptively passed beyond the age of youthful
indiscretion. By statute" he may choose his own guardian after
reaching that age and may be employed in certain vocations. 2 More-
over a female may enter into the marriage relation upon reaching
such age."
In conclusion it is submitted that the law in Kentucky is as
follows:
1. Between ages of 7 and 14, there is a prima facie presumption
that the infant is within the doctrine.
2. 14 years or over, the presumption is that an infant is without
the class of the doctrine.
3. 15 years and over the presumption of inability to come within
the terms of the doctrine is conclusive.
B. T. MOYNAHAN, JR.
7 153 Ala. 192, 45 So. 198 (1907); 141 N. C. 300, 53 S. E. 891 (1906);
SO Wash. 196, 141 Pac. 340 (1914).
S U. S. Natural Gas Co. v. Hicks, 134 Ky. 12, 119 S. W. 166 (1909).,
'Barnhill's Admr. v. Mt. Morgan Coal Co., 215 Fed. 608 (1910);
Briscoe v. Henderson Lighting & Power Co., 148 N. C. 396, 62 S. E.
COO (1908); Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Robins, 209 Ala. 6, 95 So. 367,
36 A. L. R. 10 (1923); Devine v. Armour & Co., 159 Ill. App. 74 (1910);
Hanna v. Iowa C. R. Co., 129 Ill. App. 134 (1906); Pierce v. United
Gas & Electric Co., 161 Cal. 176, 118 Pac. 700 (1911); Pollard v. Okla.
City R. R. Co., 36 Okla. 96, 128 Pac. 300 (1912).
1260 Kan. 217, 56 Pac. 4 (1899).
1' K. S., Sec. 2022.
K. S., Sec. 331a-1.
'" K. S., Sec. 2097.
